




My article, with which Professor Davis has differed with ac-
customed vigor, represents an attempt to examine a complex, difficult,
and controversial problem as to which a number of informed and
thoughtful people entertain a variety of views. Such a situation is not
conducive to debate. A thorough airing of the issues would require
"equal time" for AEC Commissioner Olson or AEC General Counsel
Naidin, who disagree strongly with my views on the structure of the
AEC and probably on the hearing process as well but who disagree
even more strongly with Professor Davis on the latter issue. And
perhaps Messrs. Berman and Hydeman, who carried out a long and
careful study of the subject for the University of Michigan Law
School's Atomic Energy Project, would also want to be heard. They
disagree with me as to the AEC's structure but also with Professor
Davis and the Commission. With three Other Views and one or
two Words More in hand, we'd have a true Donnybrook!
Since my position seems unclear,' as well as mistaken, to Professor
Davis, I should like to add a few more words on the principal matters
he has raised: the nature of the review proceedings and the combina-
tion of promotional, developmental, and regulatory responsibilities in
the Commission.
No one could have discussed with knowledgeable people over a
period of months the problems of AEC decisionmaking in reactor
licensing cases, as did the Joint Committee's staff and their consultants,
former AEC General Counsel William Mitchell and I, without growing
concerned by the apparent overjudicialization of the process. Yet, if
one thinks it wise, as I do, to require, even in an uncontested case, the
holding of an oral public proceeding before decisionmakers (as dis-
tinguished from the press-conference type of hearing Professor Davis
' Professor Davis is entitled to associate my views in general with those of the
joint Committee staff study. 1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 87TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PROCESS (it. Comm. Print 1961).
The study group worked closely together, and I helped to write the report. I found
correspondence with Professor Davis in connection with our articles helpful in de-
veloping my own ideas as well as in furthering my understanding of his. On some
points my present beliefs still lack the degree of finality that I observe in Professor
Davis'. The careful reader might discern wider areas of agreement between Professor
Davis' views and mine than Professor Davis will allow.
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recommends), some procedure has to be developed for the proceeding.
Normally the proceeding would entail the presentation, and (hope-
fully) a searching discussion, of facts, including physical theory and
expert opinions. Given its purpose, I believe this process can aptly
be called a "review," though I would not conceive it as resembling at
all closely the judicial review of administrative action. Obviously any
presentation of facts to a board has some resemblance to a trial, but I
would not call this a "trial-type hearing," for one reason because its
purpose is not to settle a dispute. I don't suppose Professor Davis
would want to label it a "trial-type hearing," but, if he should wish to
do so, that certainly is his privilege-it's his label.
Professor Davis complains, with some justice, of the generality
of the criteria I have used to suggest the different modes of procedure
which might be developed for the conduct of these "review" proceed-
ings before a technically qualified board, a matter not considered in
detail in the Joint Committee staff study. The reason for my failure
to lay down specific guidelines is simply this: I don't know enough.
I wonder if even Professor Davis does. The problem is in many ways
a distinctive one; however much one may cherish the traditional modes
of hearings ("trial-type," "argument," and "mixed"), they don't pro-
vide satisfying specific answers here.
I am somewhat comforted in acknowledging the deficiency in my
knowledge by the fact that a leading lawyer with extensive experience
in reactor licensing once urged that a study of the problem of how to
conduct these review proceedings be undertaken at the Harvard Law
School. I cite this only as evidencing his concern with the problem
and lack of assured answers to the questions it raises. Although I
share his confidence in my colleagues who are expert in administrative
law, if they were available for the study, yet I think, as I suggested in
my article, the best answers could be reached by the Board itself, pro-
vided, of course, it felt free to experiment and was not confined to
familiar patterns.
With respect to the combination of responsibilities in the Com-
mission, a problem that poses a very difficult question of judgment on
which the views of experienced observers differ widely, I should like
to make two comments on the deficiencies in my treatment that Pro-
fessor Davis has reported.
I wonder how I was able to conceal my personal views on this
issue from Professor Davis while at the same time putting forward
the concept of the independent Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 2
2 Though Professor Davis has accurately listed ways in which the Board proposed
by the study is independent of the Commission, it may be useful to recall two ways
in which the Commission and its staff would continue to participate in the regulatory
A WORD MORE
which he assails with such gusto. Be that as it may, perhaps I have
erred in failing to develop more fully the position (which Professor
Davis does not seem adequately to appreciate) that the atomic power
industry is exceedingly sensitive, indeed vulnerable, to public opinion.
Moreover, a public educated in the dangers of fallout may tend to
overanxiety-as I think was apparent in disposal matters on Cape Cod,
in Texas, in California, and on the French Riviera. Though Judge
Edgerton's requirement in the Power Reactor Dev. Co. case that the
AEC find "compelling reasons" to justify locating a big reactor near
a large city overstates the law,' yet, as a matter of cold fact, an atomic
power or test reactor exists by the grace of the exposed communities.
If the fears of such a community are sufficiently aroused, the reactor in
all probability will not be built. Measures that enhance public con-
fidence on questions of reactor safety are therefore not lightly to be
dismissed. Moreover, the AEC commitment created when the staff
presents safety arguments designed to reassure an exposed community
ought not to be confused with the very different process involved when
a technically qualified board hears staff arguments before reaching its
independent decision; selling a customer is not the same as convincing
an appraiser.
Professor Davis complains that I do not make clear whether I
think the combination of responsibilities will lead to relaxation of safe-
guards or overemphasis on them. Either result could happen; if I had
to guess, I should say the former would be more frequent. My diffi-
culty is one that I should suppose even the individual Commissioners
would share. I assume them to be honest and conscientious, but I be-
lieve it would be well-nigh impossible for a Commissioner, in a close
case, to tell whether he was leaning forward, leaning backward, or
achieving a precise verticality in reaching his decision on the safety
issue with respect to a reactor which he-or even his predecessors-had
worked long and prayerfully to get under way.'
process. (1) The staff making the original safety evaluation and presentation to the
Board would be the Commission's staff, not the Board's. (2) The Commission would
have final authority in rulemaking and so could set licensing standards that would be
binding on the Board. See Cavers, Administrative Decisionmaking in Nuclear Facili-
ties Licellsinig, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 330, 363-67 (1962).
s International Union of Elec. Workers v. United States, 280 F.2d 645, 651-52
(D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd .rub nor. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of
Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
4 Professor Davis objects that I do not give enough weight to the internal sepa-
ration achieved in the AEC. This separation is not effected in the staff until a
hearing is scheduled, that is, after the staff has decided to approve the reactor. It is
important to have free interchange between the developmental and regulatory staffs.
See 1 STAFF OF JOINT Comm. ON ATomc ENERGY, 87THl CONG., 1ST SEss., IMPROVING
Tm AEC REGULATORY PROCESS 67 (Jt. Comm. Print 1961). Separation, when
effected, operates mainly to impair decisionmaking at higher levels as both Professor
Davis and I agree. Surely I need not detail how the combination of responsibilities
1962]
392 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110:389
It is this consideration which consoles me when the inadequacy
of my investigation on this point is asserted by Professor Davis. Isn't
this rather like a number of situations in which the law, taking account
of the subtleties of human motivation and our difficulty in reconciling
conflicting goals, lays down a rule which eliminates the problem by
eliminating the conflict? The wisdom of this traditional way of deal-
ing with a problem of this sort can perhaps be most readily demon-
strated by looking back at the kind of inquiry Professor Davis would
have had me make. Only a hardened optimist among behavioral scien-
tists would expect to solve the problem on the basis of the answers that
the study Professor Davis proposes would extract.
I shall repress the temptation to delve into narrower points on
which I feel Professor Davis and I are still at odds and add only a
word more about the Holifield-Pastore bill on which Professor Davis
insists we disagree. He observes that "the sponsors have at least for
a time rejected the Cavers proposal for an independent board," ' a
statement of political fact which is open to exception only in its desig-
nation of the Joint Committee staff recommendation as "the Cavers
proposal." Perhaps he thinks me unrealistic in hoping that the hear-
ings may reveal the Commission ready to give the device of a tech-
nically qualified board a fair trial and, admonished by legislative
history written by the watchful Joint Committee staff, willing to
approach its procedural problems in nuclear facilities licensing in a less
formal, more experimental frame of mind, even though the Commis-
sion may still shrink from following Professor Davis' advice to call in
the management engineers.
at the Commission level could affect AEC decisionmalcing even-or perhaps especially
-if the Commission were never to take a case on formal review. However, the
problem must be examined on the supposition that the Commission is taking the
more active role that Professor Davis would have it assume.
5 Davis, Nuclear Facilities Licensing: Another View, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 371,
387 n.44 (1962).
